This book analyses the British governments policy towards France during the post-war Labour administrations with a view to answering one particular question: why, after emerging from the Second World War with something of a blank cheque for their future co-operation, did Britain and France become united as members of the Western alliance, but fundamentally divided on their approach to European unity by 1951? Using evidence from British official files, the work challenges the traditional thesis on British policy in Europe after 1945. It is generally believed that London was anti-European in this period; that at best she wanted European co-operation to encourage American aid to the continent, and that she wasted the goodwill towards her that the liberation of Europe had brought. The French, meanwhile, are held to have led a far-sighted and successful movement towards European union. The psychological reasons for this division are said to have been laid in the war: British institutions survived triumphant in 1945, with no need to be fused in a wider framework; but continentals emerged from defeat and occupation, willing to unite with one another.